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Abstract
Background: Empirical observations on how businesses respond after a major catastrophe are rare, especially for a
catastrophe as great as Hurricane Katrina, which hit New Orleans, Louisiana on August 29, 2005. We analyzed repeated
telephone surveys of New Orleans businesses conducted in December 2005, June 2006, and October 2007 to understand
factors that influenced decisions to re-open amid post-disaster uncertainty.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Businesses in the group of professional, scientific, and technical services reopened the
fastest in the near term, but differences in the rate of reopening for businesses stratified by type became indistinguishable
in the longer term (around two years later). A reopening rate of 65% was found for all businesses by October 2007.
Discriminant analysis showed significant differences in responses reflecting their attitudes about important factors between
businesses that reopened and those that did not. Businesses that remained closed at the time of our third survey (two years
after Katrina) ranked levee protection as the top concern immediately after Katrina, but damage to their premises and
financing became major concerns in subsequent months reflected in the later surveys. For businesses that had opened (at
the time of our third survey), infrastructure protection including levee, utility, and communications were the main concerns
mentioned in surveys up to the third survey, when the issue of crime became their top concern.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings underscore the need to have public policy and emergency plans in place prior to
the actual disaster, such as infrastructure protection, so that the policy can be applied in a timely manner before business
decisions to return or close are made. Our survey results, which include responses from both open and closed businesses,
overcome the ‘‘survivorship bias’’ problem and provide empirical observations that should be useful to improve micro-level
spatial economic modeling of factors that influence business return decisions.
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Introduction
On August 29, 2005, a surge of Gulf of Mexico water induced
by Hurricane Katrina’s high winds and low barometric pressure
penetrated a network of manmade navigation and drainage canals
in the sea-level-straddling metropolis of New Orleans, Louisiana.
Some levees along those canals were overtopped and disintegrated;
others, heightened with concrete floodwalls, deteriorated from
below. The multiple catastrophic failures sent high-velocity
torrents of salt water into certain neighborhoods and spilled into
adjacent hydrological sub-basins. By mid-week, seawater filled
nearly every basin east of the Mississippi River in New Orleans
proper, plus all those in neighboring St. Bernard and one in
Jefferson parishes. Above-sea-level neighborhoods either evaded
the deluge or saw one to three feet of water; below-sea-level areas,
which comprise half of the metropolis, suffered six to twelve feet.
Floodwaters covered roughly four-fifths of the urbanized footprint
of New Orleans on the East Bank. Close to two-thirds of New
Orleanians had their residences inundated. Over five hundred
people perished during the storm, followed a roughly equal
number during the chaotic one-week aftermath, plus another five
hundred during the traumatic months of evacuation that lay
ahead. Katrina’s death toll in the New Orleans area totaled over
1600, not including over two hundred who perished in nearby
coastal Mississippi. By early September, vast expanses of Orleans,
St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes were without population
and economic activity [1].
A few thousand evacuees began returning in late September, to
reoccupy their homes or assess the wreckage. By early October,
scores of businesses had reopened, mostly in unflooded middle-
class neighborhoods. Seventy-five percent of the hundreds of
businesses on dry, prosperous Magazine Street, for example,
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percent of those along lightly flooded, poor St. Claude Avenue
reopened in the same period. Heavily flooded areas—particularly
poor ones—remained entirely without commerce. By the new
year, about 144,000 residents out of the pre-Katrina population of
approximately 450,000 occupied their homes, while owners of
businesses pondered how to respond to the dynamic new
environment. They did so against a backdrop of great uncertainty.
In New Orleans alone, over 107,000 housing units were damaged
by flooding (most severely), while another 27,000 suffered wind
damage. Electricity, gas, and potable water—critical for both
residential as well as commercial activity—returned piecemeal to
unflooded areas throughout mid-autumn, but did not reach
flooded regions until well into 2006 and remained tenuous
citywide into 2007 [2].
During this time, citizens engaged in a series of urban planning
efforts, overseen by such entities as the Urban Land Institute, the
Bring New Orleans Back Commission, the Unified New Orleans
Plan (UNOP), and others, One key question at each forum
entailed whether the entire city would be rebuilt, or whether low-
lying, far-flung subdivisions should be converted to green space.
‘‘Shrinking the city’s footprint’’ became a political volatile issue,
which coincided with a nationally watched mayoral campaign.
Planners generally supported the concept, while social activists
resisted it fiercely and sometimes equated it with ethnic and class
cleansing. This resistance, coupled with the legal and financial
difficulty of closing down neighborhoods and compensating
homeowners, politically doomed the effort to shrink the urban
footprint. Mayor C. Ray Nagin (who cinched re-election in May
2006) generally held a laissez-faire repopulation and rebuilding
stance, saying, in effect, let people return and rebuild as they can and as
they wish, and we’ll act on the patterns as they fall in place. Federal
complicity played a role as well: FEMA’s updated Advisory Base
Flood Elevation maps—which drive flood insurance availability
and rates—turned out to be largely the same as the old 1984 maps,
thus seemingly communicating federal endorsement (as well as
actuarial encouragement) to homeowners deliberating on whether
to rebuild in low-lying areas. Funds from the Louisiana Road
Home—the state program compensating flooded homeowners
with $150,000 minus insurance settlements and FEMA grants—
imparted no special incentive to do otherwise, and no federal
compensation fund awaited those homeowners and businesses that
would have been affected by a hypothetical footprint-shrinkage
decision. The decision that the entire city would be rebuilt gave a
green light to business owners in heavily damaged neighborhoods
to continue considering reopening in place, but by no means
guaranteed their safety or success [1].
Citizens looked to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
department responsible for the levee failures, for estimating their
levelofriskinface offuture stormsandrisingsealevels.By2007,the
Corps allocated $15 billion toward protecting the city against the
threat presented by a storm with a one-percent chance of occurring
in any given year (the so-called ‘‘hundred-year storm’’). The effort,
scheduled for completion in 2011, involves the strengthening of
certain levees, the building of flood gates on drainage and
navigation canals, and the installation of pumps to remove runoff
within the city’s basins. The 2011 promise falls well short of
protecting the city, serving only to reduce its risk. That the 2006–
2007 storm seasons proved to be mild and event-free, especially
compared to the extremely busy and deadly 2005 season, probably
factored into many business reopening decisions [1].
Within city limits, social changes also affected those decisions. The
low crime rate of the first post-Katrina autumn did not last; for
reasons that continue to be debated, violent crime soared throughout
2006, climaxing (in perception if not in reality) with a march of
thousands of citizens upon City Hall in January 2007, following two
high-profile murders. The presence of National Guard troops
patrolling the streets of an American city for years after the storm
imparted a disquieting image. Crime, coupled with a deeply troubled
parish-led public education system that was largely supplanted after
the stormby state management or charterization, made New Orleans
an unattractiveoption to many families considering returning hereor
relocating here. Insurance controversies, ill-run city services, and
bleak news from scientists regarding rising seas and sinking soils,
conspired further to complicate decision-making processes. This
study seeks to understand how business owners in post-Katrina New
Orleans negotiated that process.
Businesses do not make such decisions in a vacuum. In a
complex human social dynamic system, decision makers in a post-
catastrophic event include residents, businesses, and policy makers.
While there is a rich literature on proposed theoretical models of
decision making under uncertainty [3,4], decision making related
to catastrophic events is not well understood [5]. These events are
rare, exhibit high levels of uncertainty, and offer few objective
sources of information, limiting opportunities for systematic study
based on empirical observations and formal methods of statistical
inference. This is especially true regarding business decisions after
a major catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina. In general, we
know more about how individuals make decisions in situations
involving risk [6–8], but very little about decisions by businesses,
groups, and organizations, which have large direct as well as
indirect or spatial spillover impacts on the community at large.
Moreover, literature directly addressing the relationship between
business recovery and natural disasters remains sparse and mixed
[9–14]. A better understanding of factors influencing business
decisions to return after a major disaster requires fine-scale
empirical observations collected in a timely manner. This type of
information allows analysis of spatiotemporal changes in factors
that influence decision making as well as interdependence between
decisions made by one establishment and its neighbors. The
ultimate goal of fine-scale analyses is to derive empirical rules so
that quantitative models can be developed to understand and
predict business return after a major disaster.
The discussion here focuses on a project to collect and analyze
time-critical data on business return in New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina. We employed two types of data collection:
telephone and street surveys. The telephone surveys involved all
businesses in the Orleans Parish prior to Katrina and were timed
to reflect a short term, intermediate and longer time interval, with
the first (short term) taking place in December 2005, the second
(intermediate term) in June 2006, and the third (longer term) in
October 2007. The purpose of multiple-round surveys was to
capture the spatial and temporal dynamics in factors viewed as
important by businesses in their decision making, and enable
subsequent quantitative modeling and prediction over both time
and space. The street surveys were conducted weekly for three
major commercial corridors for over three years, starting October
2005. The three commercial corridors chosen for the street survey
included: St. Claude Avenue, Magazine Street, and Carrollton
Avenue (Figure 1). St. Claude Avenue, which experienced light
flooding after Katrina, traverses a struggling, working-class
downtown neighborhood; Magazine Street serves middle- to
upper-class uptown neighborhoods and suffered no flooding;
Carrollton Avenue traverses both middle-class and working-class
neighborhoods and suffered extreme flooding in some areas, some
flooding in most areas, and none in others. These three corridors
transect a wide range of socioeconomic, historical, and topo-
graphic conditions in the city, providing a useful means for
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survey.
We present analyses of business responses based on the three
telephone surveys reflecting short, intermediate and longer term
attitudes about factors that might influence decisions about re-
opening after the hurricane. There was evidence of changing
business views over the three different time intervals, and
differences in responses when businesses were stratified according
Figure 1. Kernel density maps of businesses reopened in the three time periods. The flood map shows flood depth as of September 2,
2005.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.g001
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data collected over the two-year period following the disaster
provide a rare but useful look at business attitudes that may
influence decisions about re-opening in the aftermath of a disaster.
Results
The time-series telephone survey results were analyzed to
answer four major questions: [1] which types of businesses
returned to operation most rapidly after the disaster and where
were these located? In addition, we were interested in patterns of
change in the types of businesses that re-opened over the
intermediate and longer time horizons. [2] How did the survey
responses differ between those businesses which remained close
and those that were open at the various time horizons covered by
our survey? In addition, we were interested in whether the
responses of open and closed establishments changed over the
various time horizons. [3] How did the survey responses differ by
type of business, and was there variation in responses by different
types of businesses over time? [4] Finally, how did the survey
responses differ between those businesses that were flooded and
those that were not, and did the responses change over time?
Re-opening rates by business type
The survey response statistics (Table 1) reveal a grim picture of
business openings in New Orleans in the first two years after
Katrina. If we [1] assume that the ‘‘no answer’’ category (no
answer after five or more contact attempts) and the ‘‘disconnect-
ed’’ category (indicating a disconnected phone) represent busi-
nesses that had not yet reopened, [2] assume that those who
refused to participate in the surveys were businesses that were
open, and [3] add in those who participated in the survey but
indicated they were not open, then we find that less than 26%
businesses opened in the entire Orleans Parish (City of New
Orleans) in the first four months after Katrina. This business re-
opening rate increased to 39% around 10 months after Katrina,
and 66% two years after Katrina.
If we interpret the ‘‘disconnected’’ category as indicating short-
term business decisions to not re-open, and the ‘‘no answer’’
category as reflecting businesses who were uncertain and taking a
wait-and-see approach to the re-opening decision, then during the
first four months after Katrina, 15% of the establishments made
short-run decisions not to re-open anytime soon, and another 59%
of businesses were in the uncertain (wait-and-see) category. The
second survey reflected the intermediate term (around 10 months
after the disaster) when uncertainty about the future was reduced.
Here we find the percentage of ‘‘disconnected’’ increased to 28%
while the percentage of ‘‘no answer’’ decreased to 32%. Of course,
the latter percentage reflects a reduction in firms taking a wait-
and-see approach in the intermediate term (which seems
intuitively plausible), but also an increase in firms deciding not
to re-open (anytime soon or never) from 15% to 28% at the 10
month point. At the two-year horizon after the disaster, the
percentage of ‘‘disconnected’’ decreased substantially to 5%,
whereas ‘‘no answer’’ remained relatively constant at 29%,
indicating a stabilizing trend.
We classified business establishments in New Orleans into seven
groups, based on their North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) codes which have been constructed to reflect
similarity of economic function. Re-opening rates were calculated
for establishments classified by these seven related groups (Tables 2
& 3). In the short-run, 33 percent of establishments that were open
fell into Group 7 (professional, scientific and technical services),
and 48% of open businesses in the intermediate term (10 months
after the disaster) were of this type. In contrast, the average
opening rates for all firms were 25% and 38% in the first two
surveys. Group 4 (educational, health care, social assistance, and
public administration) suffered the most in the first four months,
with a reopening rate of only 17%. However, as time progressed,
the difference in reopening rates among businesses classified into
the seven groups diminished, with each of the groups approaching
the average reopening rate of 65% for all businesses by October
2007, approximately twenty-six months after Katrina.
We linked business openings with their geographic locations
through the use of geographic information system (GIS) methods,
Table 1. Survey statistics of the three surveys.
Dec05 Jun06 Oct07
Total sample 9132 9139 6155
Total attempted 8574 8808 5837
Others 359 439 2294
Revised (Attempted-Others) 8215 8369 3543
Completed survey 975(12%) 1418(17%) 1232(35%)
Assumed open 1173(14%) 1867(22%) 1101(31%)
Disconnected 1259 (15%) 2376(28%) 170(5%)
No answer 4808(59%) 2708(32%) 1040(29%)
Note: The percentage values were computed using ‘‘Revised’’ (Total attempted
minus Others) as denominator. (Note: ‘‘Others’’ include ‘‘no eligible
respondent’’, ‘‘incorrect business’’, and ‘‘not a business.’’; whereas ‘‘Assumed
open’’ include ‘‘hard or soft refusal’’, ‘‘busy’’, ‘‘call back’’, ‘‘fax’’, ‘‘already taken
survey’’, ‘‘partially completed’’, and ‘‘mail back’’.)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.t001
Table 2. The seven business groups and their North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes used in this paper.
Group NAICS code Description
1 11,21,22,23,31,32,33 Mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting
2 42,44,45 Wholesale and retail
3 51,52,53 Information, finance, insurance, and real estate
4 61,62,92 Educational, health care, social assistance, and public administration
5 71,72 Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services
6 48,49,55,56,81 Management of companies, waste management, transportation, warehousing, and other services
7 54 Professional, scientific, and technical services
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.t002
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businesses in each census tract for all the 181 tracts in Orleans
Parish. For visualization purposes, the results were mapped using a
kernel density smoothing method instead of the conventional tract-
level choropleth map. This allows a comparison that emphasizes
the uneven business density in the study area before and after
Katrina. A map showing flood depths immediately after Katrina
(September 2, 2005) is also shown (Figure 1). In the first (short-
term) survey the majority of tracts (56% or 100 of the 181 tracts)
had less than 20% of businesses open, and as one would expect,
tracts having a larger proportion of open businesses were located
in areas that had not been severely flooded. In the intermediate
term (ten months after Katrina in June 2006), the number of
census tracts with less than 20% businesses re-opened decreased
from 56% to 28% (representing 50 tracts). These tracts with low
re-opening rates were mostly located in areas that had higher flood
depth in the eastern part of Orleans Parish (lower Ninth Ward),
the mid-city, and Gentilly areas. Twenty-six months after (October
2007), there were still a few census tracts (4% or 7 tracts) scattered
throughout the mid-city area where less than 20% businesses had
reopened. Most census tracts exhibited reopening rates of 40% or
above by this time.
Overall survey responses
When businesses were asked to rate current prospects for their
businesses, about 51% answered that their business prospects were
better or about the same (rank 1 and 2) in the first survey,
compared with 61% and 60% in the second and third surveys,
respectively (Figure 2). Similarly, in the first survey about 19%
answered that their businesses were struggling or in danger of
closing (rank 4 and 5), compared with 15% and 14% in the second
and third surveys. These results show a significant improvement in
current business prospects between December 2005 and June
2006 (the first and second surveys), with an average rank score
decreasing from 2.54 to 2.31 over the intermediate term.
However, current business prospects remained virtually the same
between the second and third surveys (rank scores of 2.31 and
2.30; see Table 4; also see Supplementary Tables S1, S2, S3).
When businesses were asked to rate the economic recovery
progress in Orleans Parish, about 19% businesses rated the
recovery progress as satisfactory (rank 4 and 5) in the third survey,
compared with only 9% in the second survey (Figure 2). (The
question was not included in the first survey.) At the same time, it
can also be said that about 56% businesses rated the recovery
progress as unsatisfactory (rank 1 and 2) in June 2006, compared
with 45% in October 2007. The average scores for the recovery
progress improved from 2.41 to 2.68 between June 2006 and
October 2007 (Table 4).
When business owners were asked to rate a series of problems
considered barriers to return in a post-Katrina environment, the
main concern was levee protection in the first survey, with an
average score of 3.19, with the next highest concern being a lack of
customers at 2.89 (Table 4). At the time of the second survey in
June 2006 levees were still the greatest concern with an average
score of 3.20, but business owners considered utilities and
communications (mean rank values of 3.15 and 3.18, respectively)
as two equally important issues they were facing. These were
Table 3. Business opening ratio by type at the three time periods.
Group Dec05 Dec05 Dec05 Jun06 Jun06 Jun06 Oct07 Oct07 Oct07
Total Open %Open Total Open %Open Total Open %0pen
1 601 128 21 627 234 37 279 178 64
2 1533 368 24 1589 593 37 681 464 68
3 880 233 26 882 361 41 367 237 65
4 975 166 17 1007 322 32 414 252 61
5 1034 266 26 1072 397 37 481 305 63
6 1750 390 22 1746 601 34 681 429 63
7 1401 464 33 1423 676 48 598 397 66
Sum/Ave 8174 2015 25 8346 3184 38 3501 2262 65
Note: The ‘‘Total’’ column is the sum of ‘‘Completed survey’’, ‘‘Disconnect’’, ‘‘No answer’’, and ‘‘Assumed open’’ in Table 1. The ‘‘% open’’ figures were derived by
assuming ‘‘Disconnect’’ and ‘‘No answer’’ as businesses closed. Note that within the ‘‘Completed survey’’ category, a small portion of businesses remained closed even
though they participated in the survey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.t003
Figure 2. Business prospects and recovery progress rated by
business owners in different time periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.g002
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premises (3.02) and a lack of employees (2.97). Furthermore, in
the second survey, we inserted the variable ‘‘crime’’ as a potential
barrier, but business owners did not indicate this was an important
issue, reflected by its low average rank score of 2.41. In the third
survey, crime became the top concern, reflected in the average
score of (2.94) that slightly surpassed concerns regarding levee
protection (2.87).
These results show that immediately after Katrina, levee
protection was considered the most important problem by business
owners. As the city recovered during the ten months after Katrina,
levees were still the major concern, but utilities and communica-
tions joined this as equally important concerns. Twenty-six months
after Katrina, as utilities and communications were re-established
and work on levee protection was underway, business owners focus
turned away from these larger infrastructure issues to those
affecting their day-to-day operations. This is reflected in higher
scores for items such as damage to business premises, lack of
employees, and crime. Issues that were prominent in the second
survey were no longer prominent in the third survey. These results
coincide loosely with timing of an announcement by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to rebuild and strengthen the current
levee system by June 2006.
The overall response results presented above were based on all
businesses without consideration of the responses stratified by
characteristics such as business type, status of the business as open
or closed, and the depth of flooding affecting the establishments. A
closer examination of survey responses reveals important differ-
ences when stratified by these variables. For example, in the
second survey, although levee protection, utilities, and communi-
cations were identified as the most important barriers using
average rank scores, responses exhibited a bi-modal distribution
falling in the two extreme categories (ranks 1 and 5) [Supplemen-
tary Table S2]. In other words, about half of the businesses
surveyed reported levee protection as the most important barrier,
and half thought levee protection was the least important barrier.
This bi-modal pattern also existed for barriers such as utilities,
communications, damage to premises, and lack of employees. This
dichotomy of responses reflects the complexity of factors that
influence business return decisions. It also indicates that almost
every business had major concerns that impacted decisions to re-
open, but these concerns were not necessarily the same for all
firms. To further explore this issue, we consider responses stratified
by business subgroups.
Rating barriers by business type
A tabulation of the survey responses according to the seven
business groups shows that Group 1, which included businesses in
mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and hunting, generally assigned higher barrier scores than
other groups (Figure 3C). Levee protection was the top concern for
this group, followed by the lack of employees, communication, and
governmental problems. Group 3, which included businesses in
information, finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), generally
assigned the lowest barrier scores of the seven groups. The biggest
Table 4. Average ranks of barriers and prospect for all
businesses surveyed.
Problem Dec-05 Jun-06 Oct-07
Damage 2.64 3.02 2.41
Insurance 2.66 2.64 2.58
Employee 2.73 2.97 2.69
Customer 2.89 2.76 2.68
Crime – 2.41 2.94
Levee 3.19 3.20 2.87
Utilities 2.58 3.15 2.33
Communication 2.72 3.18 1.99
Environmental 2.23 2.42 1.82
Governmental 2.66 2.47 2.34
Financing 2.47 2.31 2.41
Prospect 2.54 2.31 2.30
Recovery Progress – 2.41 2.68
Note: Except for the ‘‘recovery progress’’ variable, scores range from 1 to 5 and
the higher the score, the more important the problem.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.t004
Figure 3. Rating of barriers by businesses according to their (A)
flood status and (B) opening status in the three surveys, and
(C) by business groups in survey-1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006765.g003
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Group 1, but the lowest (2.77) by Group 5, which includes
businesses in arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and
food services (Supplementary Table S4). In contrast, top barriers
for Group 5 were a lack of employees and customers, while the
latter was considered the lowest barrier for Group 1 businesses.
These results indicate a great deal of variation in survey
responses within and between groups, with no discernable pattern.
A formal statistical discriminant analysis was conducted to
determine if the groups could be clearly distinguished using the
11 barrier variables. The results indicated that only 26% of all
businesses could be correctly classified using the response data
from the first survey. This suggests that barrier variables are not
capable of distinguishing/discriminating between businesses
classified into the seven groupings. In other words, the seven
groups derived using the NAICS codes were not distinctive in
terms of their responses/attitudes regarding potential barriers. The
percentage of businesses correctly classified by discriminant
analysis carried out using the second and third surveys were
about the same, 22% and 24% respectively. Based on this, we can
conclude that other factors such as business open/closed status or
flooded/non-flooded status may be more important than the
NAICS codes (purportedly reflecting similarity of economic
function) in explaining the survey responses.
Rating barriers by open/closed status
When the survey responses were tabulated by the open/closed
status of businesses, those businesses closed at the time of the
survey gave consistently higher barrier scores than those that were
open, as we might expect (Figure 3B; Supplementary Table S5).
The barriers were perceived as even more important by owners of
businesses still closed during the second survey, as indicated by
survey response scores that were consistently the highest across all
barrier variables. The top concern for businesses that remained
closed shifted from levee protection in the first survey to damage to
premises in the second survey. In the third survey, ratings of
barriers by the businesses that remained closed were not consistent
across the barrier variables. Financing became the top concern,
followed by the lack of employees and levee protection.
A discriminant analysis that used the open/closed binary
variable of each business as the group variable and the 11 barrier
variables as predictors was conducted. The results show that about
70% of all the businesses were correctly classified into open or
closed based on their survey responses in the first survey, and the
classification accuracy slightly increased to 72% in both the second
and third surveys. Based on the structural matrices derived from
the discriminant analysis, the most important variable that
distinguished between businesses that were opened versus
businesses that remained closed was damage to premises in the
first time period. In the second and third time periods, financing
became the top variable that distinguished those businesses that
were open from those that were not.
From an economic theory perspective, the difference in
responses between open and closed businesses makes sense. For
an open business, there is no marginal (additional) cost to open
and so their concerns are with customers, employees, and other
typical business challenges. If the business is profitable, it may pay
to stay open even if another catastrophe could occur at any time.
The potential for a catastrophe reduces the time horizon and thus
the value of the business whether it is held by the existing owners
or sold to new owners. Therefore, for a currently opened business
long-term problems such as the potential damage from a natural
disaster reduces the value of the business, the amount of optimal
investment in the business, and the potential long-term market for
their goods and services. For a closed business, the marginal cost of
opening may be substantial and there has to be enough long-term
benefit to support the substantial costs of re-opening. Therefore, a
closed business must pay more attention to long-term prospects
than an open business. Nonetheless, both types of firms profit as
the long-term outlook improves, although the contrast is greatest
for the closed firms.
Rating barriers by flood status
Since the initial survey did not include a question regarding
flood status, we derived this information by linking business
locations with the LIDAR image data to determine whether each
business in the survey was flooded or not. In the second and third
surveys, a flood status question was included. When the ratings of
barriers were tabulated by the flood status of businesses, similar
results to that of the open/closed status were obtained. Businesses
that were flooded gave higher scores than those that were not
flooded. The barriers were perceived to be more serious in the
second time period, as businesses that had been flooded gave the
highest scores for almost all barrier variables (Figure 3A;
Supplementary Table S6), with damage to premises ranked the
highest, followed by levee protection and communications.
Results from the discriminant analysis conducted using the
binary flood status as the group variable resulted in a 73% correct
classification based on the barrier responses from the first survey.
The classification accuracy increased to 79% and 74%, respec-
tively, in the second and third surveys. The most important
variables that distinguished those businesses flooded from those
not flooded were very consistent for the three time periods. These
were: damage to premises, followed by utilities in the second
survey and levee protection in the second and third surveys.
The earlier comments regarding the economics of open/closed
businesses are relevant here as well, since flooding impacts the
chances that a business is open/closed as well as the marginal cost
of opening for a closed business. In the absence of flooding, there is
no marginal (additional) cost to open and so concerns of non-
flooded establishments center on customers, employees, and other
typical business challenges. For a flooded (or closed) business, the
marginal cost of opening may be substantial and there has to be
enough long-term benefit to support the substantial costs of re-
opening. Therefore, a closed/flooded business must pay more
attention to long-term prospects ’than an open/non-flooded
business.
Discussion
Literature directly addressing business return after a major
natural disaster is relatively limited. Moreover, the findings from
the already scanty literature are mixed and sometimes contradic-
tory [13,14]. Some studies argue that disasters have few effects
beyond the immediate or short-term recovery periods [11,12],
while others conclude that at most, natural disasters exacerbate
existing trends [15,16]. Yet another group of studies actually
suggests that climate-related disasters have long-term positive
economic consequences related to physical capital, human capital,
and productivity [17,18]. Furthermore, most studies have been
conducted at a regional scale, which may obscure heterogeneity in
impacts of disasters on local communities. Conclusions about the
economic impacts of a natural disaster made at the broad regional
scale may be very different from those derived at finer spatial
scales.
At a broader scale, earlier studies suggested that business
decisions to locate or relocate could include factors such as future
hurricane risks, economic impacts, insurance rates, emergency
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scale, the literature generally shows that small businesses and non-
profit organizations do not recover from major disasters [14],
citing the ability, or rather the inability, to adapt as a crucial
variable for these small businesses to recover [20]. For example, a
study of the Northridge earthquake found that small businesses
were more vulnerable and less likely to recover [9]. Webb and
others compared business recovery patterns in Santa Cruz
County, California after the Loma Prieta earthquake and South
Dade County, Florida after Hurricane Andrew using surveys [11].
They found that most businesses did not experience long-term
declines, and that retail businesses were less likely to recover after a
natural disaster. However, they also acknowledged their study
might be biased because surveys were conducted six and eight
years after the disaster events. As noted earlier, ‘‘survival bias’’ can
arise in these circumstances where surveys do not include
businesses that closed in the short-term and/or those leaving the
region. Based on Webb and others’ findings, Waugh and Smith
inferred that New Orleans would have a more difficult time
recovering from Katrina due to its large tourism industry that
consists of many small retail businesses [14]. Kates and others also
pointed to a long reconstruction period for New Orleans noting
the declining population trend of the city [15].
There is also a body of literature on vulnerability and resilience
which could be used to shed light on our study of business
decisions to re-open after a major disaster. However, the existing
literature has seldom addressed how individual businesses
aggregate to create a community [21–24]. Webb and others
suggested the need for a multi-level conceptualization of long-term
business vulnerability and resilience following disasters, which
would include not only firm-level characteristics, but also
neighborhood characteristics and the broader natural and
socioeconomic environments [11,12]. More recently, Zhang and
others proposed a conceptual model of disaster impacts on
businesses and identified a number of key factors that would
increase or decrease business’ vulnerability [16]. Although their
models were not fully developed, their work highlighted the need
for public policy research to help reduce business vulnerability to
natural disasters.
For the most part, our findings support findings reported in past
literature. Similar to previous studies, businesses in the profes-
sional, scientific and technical services were found to open more
rapidly in the aftermath of Katrina, whereas businesses in
educational, health care, social assistance, and public administra-
tion suffered most during the immediate aftermath (first four
months). However, the differences in rates of business return
among the seven different grouping of businesses by type became
indistinguishable at a two year horizon after the disaster, with the
average reopening rate for each of the groups approaching 65%
by October 2007. This equaled the overall average rate of return
for all businesses at the two-year horizon. We also note that the
overall rate of business return was remarkably similar to the 67%
rate of return for jobs reported by the Brookings Institute during
the second quarter of 2007[25].
Unlike previous studies, we were able to include responses from
individual businesses that remained closed at the time of each
survey for a sequence of three surveys reflecting short-,
intermediate- and long-term horizons for the aftermath of the
Katrina disaster. The responses from businesses open and closed
were significantly different, as revealed by a statistical discriminant
analysis. Both groups of firms identified levee protection as the
prime concern in the short-term, but diverged regarding which
factors represented the greatest barriers to business return in the
intermediate and longer-term horizons. For example, damage to
business premises and financing problems were viewed as major
obstacles by businesses that remained closed, whereas utilities,
communications infrastructure and crime were major concerns of
businesses that were open. Similar differences in responses were
found for businesses that were flooded versus those that were not.
From an economic theory perspective, the difference in
responses between open and closed (as well as flooded and non-
flooded) businesses makes sense. As elaborated earlier, for an open
business, there is no marginal (additional) cost to open and so their
concerns are with customers, employees, and other typical
business challenges. For a closed business, the marginal cost of
opening may be substantial and there has to be enough long-term
benefit to support the substantial costs or reopening. Therefore, a
closed business must pay more attention to long-term prospects
than an open business. Nonetheless, both types of firms profit as
the long-term outlook improves, although the contrast is greatest
for the closed firms.
In addition, open and closed businesses differ by their inherent
vulnerability to disasters. If a business closes due to flooding, in the
absence of more infrastructure the flooding will likely reoccur. In
contrast, a business that survives a large natural disaster has
excellent prospects of surviving future disasters of the same sort.
Therefore, the priorities of these types of businesses will likely
differ. Consequently, studies of only open or closed businesses
suffer from sample selection bias where results from an analysis of
one group may not apply to another group. Also, analyzing open
and closed businesses together (without separate treatment) results
in aggregation bias where the results based treating two groups as
one are not truly representative of either group.
Multiple rounds of surveys conducted in this study provide a
rare but revealing picture of how businesses attitudes change over
time in an uncertain environment, and results of this type have not
been reported in past literature. Three conclusions/insights can be
highlighted. First, critical infrastructure protection of the impacted
area, in this case levee protection, utilities, and telecommunica-
tion, stood out as prime concerns influencing business’ decisions to
return. This is expected and easily understood given the extreme
levels of damaged caused by the Hurricane Katrina-induced levee
failures.
Second, the associated impacts or collateral damages due to the
disastrous event could play an even more significant role than the
event itself in business’ decisions to reopen. The large number of
businesses (59%) that remained uncertain four months after
Katrina indicates that business owners were weighting their
options and taking a wait-and-see attitude. Businesses will likely
return or re-open if there are timely and adequate recovery plans
that can help repair property flooded or otherwise damaged by the
event. Likewise, an emergency plan designed for rapid restoration
of clean water, power, roads, public transportation, and
telecommunications would help eliminate a major concern of
businesses and presumably increase the likelihood of business
return even in cases where establishments were not flooded. It is
noteworthy that ten months after Katrina, businesses that were re-
opened still considered levee protection, utilities, and communi-
cations as primary concerns, rather than more typical business
concerns such as a lack of customers and employees. This points to
a need for an adequate plan to protect the infrastructure in
locations such as New Orleans that are subject to frequent
hurricanes, since this would help minimize at-large impacts on the
community that discourage the return of businesses.
These two conclusions underscore the importance of developing
effective public policy and emergency plans to reduce business
vulnerability and boost economic recovery. The results also point
to the need to apply such policy in a timely manner before business
Business Return in New Orleans
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6765decisions to return or close are made. Insofar as many of the
disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes associated with a
particular area are well-known, as much as possible basic land use
policies, building codes, and other regulations should be in place
prior to the actual disaster. This reduces uncertainty on the part of
businesses and consumers and will thus aid recovery and
rebuilding. Moreover, large scale disasters usually result in
governmental aid. However, the timing and amount of this aid
is uncertain immediately after a disaster. In contrast, insurance
programs, private or public, provide aid that automatically reflects
the scope of the disaster. Encouraging individuals or businesses
into insurance programs helps fund reserves for disaster recovery,
provides more immediate aid, and helps maintain the locational
value of vulnerable sites. The insurance program rules, if designed
adequately, can promote resiliant rebuilding.
Third, an unexpected negative impact not documented in
previous literature was increased crime in New Orleans after
Katrina. A question regarding crime was included in the second
survey, but businesses did not consider this an important issue in
the intermediate term, ranking this with the lowest score.
However, in the longer-term (twenty-six months after Katrina),
crime rose to become the major concern of businesses, surpassing
physical infrastructure and economic issues. The massive evacu-
ation and displacement of families might have contributed to the
breakdown of existing social networks in New Orleans ultimately
leading to a dramatic increase in crime. It is clear that crime
prevention (along with education and health services) can be
considered an element of social infrastructure or adaptation policy
that should improve societal resilience, which in turn increase
business resilience and economic recovery.
Hurricane Katrina remains to be the costliest natural disaster to
hit the United States both in terms of the number of people killed
and property loss. There are many lessons to learn, and one
frequently mentioned theme is the need to develop measures to
prevent and mitigate the impacts. The results from the three
surveys of businesses in the Orleans Parish are not completely new,
but they provide empirical observations about business attitudes
regarding infrastructure protection and other social adaptation
policies needed to minimize spillover impacts and increase
resilience and economic recovery. A major implication of the
findings, which should be applicable to other major disasters in
other localities, is that policies and regulations related to disaster
prevention and mitigation should already be in place prior to the
actual disaster to minimize uncertainty faced by business owners.
Finally, we note that detailed planning strategies at a local level
will need to rely on results based on detailed quantitative models,
which are currently being developed based on the survey
observations. Critical questions such as what factors influence
individual business decisions to reopen, how re-opening of a
business in one location would affect the decision of neighboring
establishments to re-open (i.e., the spatial spillover impacts) and
what types of aid strategies would be most effective will be
addressed in the next phase of the project that focuses on spatial
modeling.
Materials and Methods
The telephone surveys were conducted for all businesses in the
Orleans Parish in three different times: December 2005, June
2006, and October 2007. The purpose of multiple round surveys is
to capture the spatial and temporal dynamics in business attitudes
that influence their decision making and to enable subsequent
quantitative modeling and prediction over both time and space.
The first survey, conducted four months after Katrina, provided
the first business outlook of New Orleans after Katrina, thus the
preliminary report of its results generated wide national and local
media attention. The second survey, conducted ten months after
Katrina, followed the same survey instrument with minor
modifications, so that the results can be used to track the changing
patterns of business return through time after a major catastrophe.
The third survey, conducted 26 months after Katrina, was in
collaboration with the Louisiana Recovery Authority.
All three surveys were conducted for the entire Orleans Parish
(county) using the August 2005 Louisiana Department of Labor
Micro File for Economic Development in the greater New Orleans
Area, which includes also Jefferson and St. Tammany Parishes.
There were about 33,000 businesses in all three parishes that
existed before Katrina. The file contains confidential information
of about 45 variables for each business establishment. Variables
that are of especially useful for our research include: the NAICS
code (National Association of Industry Code) classification of the
type of business, names of the businesses, physical address,
telephone, contact person, longitude and latitude, zip code, census
tract, census block, parish location, number of employees, and
aggregate wages. The surveys were conducted with assistance from
the Louisiana State University Public Policy Research Laboratory.
As in any typically large data file, there are coding mistakes and
missing data. A number of tedious steps were taken to correct and
validate the business establishment file before the phone survey.
For example, some of the longitude and latitude coordinates for
the location of businesses did not match the parish or zip code
locations. We utilized GIS methods such as address matching and
mapping to correct all the errors we identified. We then extracted
only the records for Orleans Parish, which resulted in a total of
about 11,000 businesses before Katrina. Special attention was paid
to multi-establishment firms which had several locations (e.g.,
national chains such as Wal-Mart and fast food franchises), thus
resulting in several records in the file. These firms listed a single
contact person, allowing us to extract ‘‘unique’’ records to avoid
duplication. This resulted in about 10,000 unique businesses in
Orleans Parish that were used for the phone survey.
The survey questions were designed to be short and direct to
maximize participation. Also, questions were kept basically the
same for all three surveys to enable comparison over time.
However, since we combined our third survey with the research
group from the Louisiana Recovery Authority, the third survey
was much longer than the previous two, but the first part of the
questions is the same as the previous two surveys to enable
comparison. The three main questions asked in most of the three
surveys were: [1] Are you open for business? If not, when do you
plan to open? Was your business flooded? [2] Rank the major
problems/barriers for your businesses from 1 to 5, with 1 being no
problem at all and 5 being a major problem: damage to Premises?
Insurance? Lack of employees? Lack of customer base? levee
protection? Suppliers? Utilities? Communications? Environmental
problems? Governmental problems? Financing? Crime? Others?)
[3] How optimistic are you about the future of your business? In
addition, we had an open-ended question for businesses to identify
the most effective ways to help economic recovery.
In Table 1, a business was put into the ‘‘No answer’’ category if
there were no answer after five or more attempts at contact, which
is interpreted as businesses that had not yet reopened. The
‘‘Disconnected’’ category represents a disconnected phone line,
which leads to the inference that the business never reopened. Of
those who answered calls, some completed the survey and these
responses were designated as ‘‘Complete,’’ whereas the ‘‘Others’’
category included: hard or soft refusal to complete the survey, no
eligible respondents, surveys to be faxed or mailed, partial
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and ‘‘Others’’ categories are interpreted as businesses that are
open or have the potential to open at the time of the survey.
The flood map in Figure 1 was created from a raster file
representing the flood depth by September 02, 2005. The file was
originated by the U.S. Army corps of Engineers and can be
accessed from Louisiana State University GIS Information
Clearinghouse, CADGIS Research Laboratory, via the website:
http://www.katrina.lsu.edu. The dataset, defined in ArcGIS grid
file format with a spatial resolution of 25 meters, covers Orleans,
Jefferson and St. Bernard parishes.
The kernel density maps were created using a spatial resolution
of 100 meters and a search radius (kernel size) of 1000 meters via
the software ArcGIS. A larger kernel size would smooth the result,
while a smaller one will have the opposite effect. The first and
second surveys comprise in practical terms the whole population of
the study area (all businesses in Orleans Parish), while the third
survey was constrained with the resources and collaboration with
the Louisiana Recovery Authority, resulting in only a sample of
businesses surveyed, even though it is a large sample. This creates
problem for mapping the business density from the third survey. In
order to visually compare the results of the kernel maps of the
three surveys, we added to the analysis a weight factor. In the pre-
Katrina case, the weight value was set to 1 for all the businesses. In
the first and second surveys, the weight factor was set to 1 for
businesses that were opened and 0 for businesses that were closed.
For the third survey, the weight factor for opened businesses was
set as the ratio between the total number of businesses attempted
in the second survey and that of the third survey (8346/
3501=2.38) (see Table 3).
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